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THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT AND
THE FUNCTIONALITY FALLACY
Lora Saltarelli*
INTRODUCTION
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) has fundamen-
tally altered traditional copyright law.' It grants copyright owners an
unprecedented right to control access to their works, in addition to
the traditional right of controlling uses of their work.2 The DMCA
notably departs from the traditional focus on wrongful uses by prohib-
iting circumvention of measures that control access to copyrighted
works or making available technology that facilitates such circumven-
tion.3 These prohibitions apply without regard as to whether the use
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2003; B.A. Psychology,
The College of NewJersey, 2000. I would like to thank Bobby, my brother and best
friend, for his cogent explanations of technical issues, the time he spent helping me
develop arguments, and especially for his patience in answering the many questions I
posed. I would also like to thank Professor Patricia Bellia of the Notre Dame Law
School for her insightful comments and suggestions regarding this Note and all the
members of Notre Dame Law Review for their hard work. Finally, I would like to thank
my family and friends for their unconditional love and support.
1 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205
(Supp. V 1999)).
2 Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination,
101 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1613, 1632 (2001) (explaining that "[t]raditional rights under
copyright did not entitle the copyright owner to dictate the user's enjoyment of her
copy; copyright owners' control over an individual copy was "exhausted" with its
sale"); ShandraJ. Kotzun, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Anticircumvention
Ban Gives More Rights to Copyright Owners, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INrt.L. PROP. 123, 134
(2001) ("[T]he copyright owner gains more rights through the DMCA than they pre-
viously had. By being able to protect copyrighted works through technological pro-
tective measures, it ensures that information users cannot make fair use of the
material as was previously allowed under copyright law."); Hannibal Travis, Comment,
Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15
BERxELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 837 (2000) ("Uncompromising anti-circumvention laws thus
permit the copyright holders to expand their rights to encompass every conceivable
use for an period of indefinite time."); see 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. V 1999).
3 Eddan Elizafon Katz, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc. & Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 69 (2001); see 17 U.S.C.
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after circumvention violates any of the copyright holder's exclusive
rights, 4 which led the Second Circuit to hold that defenses to copy-
right infringement liability are not available for circumvention liabil-
ity.5 This prohibition fails to take into account that "[v]irtually any
technology can be used for good or evil; the person operating the
technology determines the role that technology plays."'6 By focusing
on technology, Congress "upset the balance between copyright pro-
tection and public access by assigning absolute rights to the copyright
owner while creating only narrow exemptions for technology innova-
tors, academic researchers, and the general public."
7
§ 1201(a) (1) (prohibiting the act of circumvention); id. § 1201(a) (2) (prohibiting
providing or trafficking in access-control circumvention technologies or devices). See
generally Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 366-67 (1999) (discussing the
tension between copyright and the public domain and the effects of "enclosing" infor-
mation by access controls).
4 Katz, supra note 3, at 63-64, 66-67 (2001); see Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Access control measures such
as CSS do involve some risk of preventing lawful as well as unlawful uses of copy-
righted material."), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429
(2d Cir. 2001); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 739 (2000) (noting that Congress did not restrict liability
under the anti-trafficking provision "to those who induce or collude with bad actors"
and that "Congress deliberately failed to incorporate a fair use exemption"); see also
infra note 10 (listing copyright holder's exclusive rights).
5 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459-60 (2d Cir. 2001);
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321-24.
6 Jonathan Band & Taro Issihiki, The New Anti-Circumvention Provisions in the Copy-
right Act: A Flawed First Step, 3 CYBER. LAW., Feb. 1999, at 2.
7 Katz, supra note 3, at 69; see Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1627-36 (discussing
history of congressional balancing of rights and the effect the DMCA may have on
that balance). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (exempting from civil liability "non-
profit library, archives, or educational institution which gains access to a commercially
exploited copyrighted work solely in order to make a good faith determination of
whether to acquire a copy of that work"); id. § 1201 (f) (1) (exempting reverse engi-
neering "for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the pro-
gram that are necessary to achieve interoperability... and that have not previously
been readily available ... to the extent any such acts ... do not constitute infringe-
ment under this title" from liability for circumvention); id. § 1201 (g) (exempting en-
cryption research "conducted to advance the state of knowledge in the field of
encryption technology or to assist in the development of encryption products" actor
meets conditions set forth in the subsection); id. § 1201(i) (exempting circumvention
for protection of personally identifying information if the actor complies with the
subsection's provisions); id. § 1201() (1) (exempting circumvention for purpose of
security testing "solely for the purpose of good faith testing, investigating, or cor-
recting, a security flaw or vulnerability, with the authorization of the owner or
operator").
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Congress enacted the DMCA in pursuance of the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty.8 The DMCA
amended the Copyright Act of 1976,9 which grants certain exclusive
rights to copyright holders.' 0 It, like the DMCA, was enacted pursuant
to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause, which empowers
Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."" One of the principal
8 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1205) (Supp. V 1999)). On December 20, 1996, the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO) held a conference in Geneva that led to the adoption of
two treaties. See generally WIPO, Treaties and Contracting Parties, at http://www.
wipo.org/treaties/index.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2002) (providing information
about the treaties that it administers). The United States became a contracting party
to the WIPO Copyright Treaty on April 12, 1997. WIPO Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), available at 1997 WL 447232. Article 11 of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty requires contracting parties to "provide adequate legal protection
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological mea-
sures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights ... and
that restrict acts ... not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law."
Id. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)-(b) (prohibiting circumvention of access-control
and copyright protection measures); id. § 1202 (protecting integrity of copyright
management information); id. § 1203 (providing civil remedies); id. § 1204 (provid-
ing for criminal sanctions); Nimmer, supra note 4, at 682-85 (discussing the legisla-
tive history of the DMCA); Michelle A. Ravn, Note, Navigating Terra Incognita: Why the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act Was Needed To Chart the Course of Online Service Provider
Liability for Copyright Infringement, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 755, 778-87 (1999) (discussing leg-
islative debates and proposed legislation leading to the enactment of the DMCA).
9 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1205) (Supp. V 1999); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1999)).
10 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). The statute provides as follows:
Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of a copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
purposes of copyright law is to provide an economic incentive that will
serve the public interest and increase public knowledge by stimulating
the creation and dissemination of works.' 2 In enacting the DMCA,
Congress sought to secure this economic incentive by providing in-
creased protection for works in digital format because of the in-
creased risk of piracy in the digital medium. 13
The DMCA contains two separate circumvention provisions. The
access-control provision prohibits the circumvention of measures that
control access to copyrighted works or making such circumvention
technology available. 14 The rights protection provision only prohibits
trafficking in technologies that circumvent "protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner" but does not prohibit the actual act of circumvention.15 This
Note addresses the application of the access-control provision, 16 fo-
cusing on the First Amendment issues that arise when the prohibited
"technology"17 is also "speech." This Note does not address the rights
protection provision because it is limited to protection of the exclu-
12 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
("By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (finding that primary purpose of copyright is
to promote progress). See ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INFORMATION
CONTROL 41-49 (2001), for a discussion of the incentives-based, role-utilitarian argu-
ment for justifying protection of intellectual property. He concludes that it "fails to
justify anything remotely close to [the] Anglo-American system of intellectual prop-
erty." Id. at 49.
13 See Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 2281, 34
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 2168 (Nov. 2, 1998); Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1615-18.
14 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (Supp. V 1999). In this subsection, circumvention means
"to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to
avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the au-
thority of the copyright owner." Id. § 1201 (a) (3) (A). It prohibits circumvention of a
"technological measure that effectively controls access to a work." Id. § 1201 (a) (1) (A)
(emphasis added). For the purposes of this subsection "a technological measure 'ef-
fectively controls access to a work' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its opera-
tion, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the
authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work." Id. § 1201 (a) (3) (B).
15 Id. § 1201(b) (1) (emphasis added). In this subsection, circumvention means
"avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a technological
measure." Id. § 1201(b) (2) (A).
16 Id. § 1201 (a).
17 Id. § 1201 (a) (2) (prohibiting trafficking in "any technology .. . or part
thereof").
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sive rights granted under the Copyright Act and therefore does not
raise the same First Amendment concerns.' 8
Part I explains the DMCA's provisions, the facts leading to the
first application of the access-control provision, and the terminology
of the technologies at issue. Part II.A outlines the fundamental differ-
ences between the two types of computer code: source code and ob-
ject code. It suggests that they should be distinguished for purposes
of the First Amendment analysis because source code expresses the
writer's ideas and is not directly executable by a computer.' 9 It argues
that because source code is pure speech, the Second Circuit should
not have subjected it to a lesser standard than that which is applied to
regulations of pure speech. Part II.B argues that under Supreme
Court precedent neither the (alleged) functionality of code nor the
use of the Internet, as a medium for communication, justifies the ap-
plication of a lesser standard of First Amendment protection. Fur-
thermore, the DMCA is a content-based regulation; therefore, even if
source code is functional, courts should analyze regulations of it
under strict scrutiny. Part III discusses the DMCA's applicability to
the press. It argues that Supreme Court precedent requires strict
scrutiny when the traditional media is "punished" for publishing
truthful information and that this same standard is applicable to pub-
lication by the media on the Internet. Part IV argues that the Second
Circuit affirmed the suppression of speech based on generalized pre-
dictions, without requiring evidence that the anticipated harm
(piracy) was a realistic possibility. It further argues that the regulation
of source code, even if it is functional, cannot be treated as analogous
to a content-neutral regulation of expressive conduct.
18 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)
("First Amendment protections [are) already embodied in the Copyright Act's dis-
tinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and
the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use."); see also
Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1632 (explaining that the rights-protection provisions have
not "provoked the same ire as the provisions on circumvention of access-controls, in
part because fair use and other copyright defenses remain available ... [and] because
they seem primarily to protect the status quo in the digital environment rather than
to open up new realms of copyright owning opportunities"). See generally Neil Wein-
stock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1
(discussing tension between copyright and First Amendment).
19 See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY
A. Access-Control Provision
The access-control provision prohibits the act of circumventing
"a technological measure that effectively controls access to a [copy-
righted] work. ' 20 It also separately prohibits offering to the public,
providing or otherwise trafficking in any technology2' that is "prima-
rily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing,"22 has
"only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent,"23 or "is marketed ... for use in circumventing. 2 4
The DMCA contains multiple civil remedies. Any person who is
injured by a violation of § 120125 may seek damages,26 costs, 2 7 attor-
ney fees, 28 and destruction of the device that is part of the violation. 29
Additionally, a court "may grant temporary and permanent injunc-
tions on such terms as it deems reasonable to prevent or restrain a
violation."30 The DMCA also provides for criminal sanctions when a
person "willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain" violates § 1201.3 1
B. Facts Leading to the First Application of the Trafficking Prohibition
Movies (for home viewing) have traditionally been available in
analog format, which can be placed on video cassettes, and played on
20 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (A); see also supra note 14 (defining "effectively controls
access").
21 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2). As a whole, this subsection prohibits manufacturing,
importing, offering to the public, providing, or otherwise trafficking in "any technol-
ogy, product, service, device, component, or part thereof." Id. § 1201(a)(2). This
Note only discusses offering, providing, or otherwise trafficking because the other
prohibited actions are regulating conduct that is not speech. It also focuses only on
the prohibition of "any technology" because, unlike the other prohibitions that pro-
hibit tangible things or actions, it is broad enough to encompass pure speech or ex-
pressive conduct.
22 Id. § 1201 (a) (2) (A).
23 Id. § 1201 (a) (2) (B).
24 Id. § 1201(a) (2) (C).
25 Id. § 1203(a).
26 Id. § 1203(b)(3).
27 Id. § 1203(b)(4).
28 Id. § 1203(b) (5).
29 Id. § 1203(b) (6).
30 Id. § 1203(b) (1). The court may not grant an injunction if it would constitute
"a prior restraint on free speech or the press protected under the 1st amendment to
the Constitution." Id.
31 Id. § 1204.
1652 [VOL- 77:5
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a video cassette recorder (VCR).32 During the 1990s, the major movie
studios began developing technology to provide movies in digital for-
mat.33 They developed an optical media storage device called a digital
versatile disk (DVD) to store movies in digital format.3 4 DVDs pro-
vided improved audio and visual quality, larger data storage capacity,
and greater longevity than video cassettes.3 5
The studios were concerned about providing works in digital for-
mat because digital files can be copied without degradation, which
increases the risk of piracy.3 6 To minimize that risk, they agreed that
the DVD would be the standard medium for home distribution of dig-
ital works and sought an encryption scheme to protect movies placed
on DVDs.3 7 In 1996, the studios adopted Content Scramble System
(CSS), which encrypts the digital files on the DVD according to an
algorithm.3 8 A DVD player cannot access the contents of CSS en-
crypted DVDs unless it contains "player keys" capable of decrypting
the digital files.39
The studios formed an organization, the DVD Copy Control Asso-
ciation (DVD CCA), that grants licenses to consumer electronics man-
ufacturers so that they are able to produce compliant devices.40 The
32 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 2001).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 435. A DVD is similar to a compact disk (CD) but differs in some ways,
such as its capability of storing larger amounts of data. Id. at 435 n.1.
35 Id. at 436.
36 See id. Unlike works in analog format, works in digital format do not lose per-
ceptible quality during the copying process. See id. Additionally, it is possible to con-
tinuously create virtually perfect copies of a work in digital format because the
copying process does cause physical degradation to the digital files. See id. In con-
trast, the copying process itself will eventually destroy a work in analog format because
it physically degrades the "tape," on which the work is stored. See id. See generally John
Borland, Studios Scramble To Prevent Net Piracy, CNET News.com (Oct. 25, 1999), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1040-231874.html (discussing MPAA's efforts to develop
technology to prevent online piracy).
37 Corley, 273 F.3d at 436.
38 Id. The algorithm is a mathematical formula that is used to scramble the digi-
tal files. Id. CSS code is embedded in the movie itself. Id. at 452.
39 Id. at 436-37. DVD players can be stand-alone devices or a component of a
computer. Id. at 436. Decryption also requires the player to "understand" the CSS
algorithm. Id. at 437. An algorithm is a set of instructions to complete a task. The
player keys are actually decryption keys, and in that way "understand" the CSS al-
gorithm. Andy Patrizo, Why theDVD Hack Was a Cinch, Wired News (Nov. 2, 1999), at
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,32263-2,00.html (discussing secur-
ity flaws in one company's DVD player that enabled reverse engineering).
40 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 341 (Ct. App. 2001).
There are 400 player keys on every DVD, and each licensee is assigned one or more
keys unique to that license. Id. All of the major motion picture studios belong to the
2002] 1653
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manufacturers pay an administrative fee to receive player keys and
other necessary information, which is subject to strict security require-
ments.4' In 1997, the studios introduced DVDs to the consumer mar-
ket, where they quickly gained acceptance and became a significant
source of revenue for the studios.42 By the end of 1997, almost all
released DVDs were CSS encrypted. 43
In September of 1999,JonJohansen, a fifteen-year-old Norwegian
citizen, created computer code called DeCSS. 44 The code, when in
executable form, can decrypt the CSS encryption, thereby allowing
the user to copy the decrypted file onto the computer hard drive.45
There are two types of computer code: object code and source
code. Object code represents instructions to the computer as a se-
DVD CCA. Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement in the Internet Age: The Law
and Technology of Digital Rights Management, 11 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y
1, 11 (2001). See generally DVD CCA, Content Scrambling System, at http://www.dvd
cca.org/css/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2002) (describing the differing requirements and
processes to obtain CSS licensing agreement or information related to such
agreements).
41 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), affd sub nom. Corley, 273 F.3d 429; see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 437 (discussing
some of the security requirements contained in the CSS licensing agreement).
42 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 437. Judge Kaplan found that "DVDs have proven not
only popular, but lucrative for the studios." Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 310. He
noted that revenue from the sale and rental of DVDs "currently accounts for a sub-
stantial percentage of... revenue from the home video market" and that the "home
market, in turn, makes up a large percentage of the studios' total distribution reve-
nue." Id. at 310-11.
43 Corley, 273 F.3d at 437 n.3.
44 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 310; see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 437 (providing
additional background information aboutJohansen and the development of DeCSS).
In collaboration with two unidentified individuals, Johansen reverse-engineered a li-
censed DVD player to determine the encryption algorithm and "player keys." Corley,
273 F.3d at 437. He used this information to create a computer program capable of
decrypting CSS scrambled files. Id. See generally Andy Patrizo, DVD Piracy: It Can Be
Done, Wired News (Nov. 1, 1999), at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,12
82,32249,00.html (discussing technical aspects of DeCSS code and its use). All licen-
sees of DVD technology are required to encrypt their decryption key so that "no one
can reverse-engineer the playback software and extract the key." Patrizo, supra note
39. One licensee did not encrypt its key and, thus, Jon Johansen was able to reverse-
engineer that player and obtain a player key. Id. DeCSS equipped with one player
key would not have posed a piracy threat because the key could be removed from
future players. Id. However, because the CSS algorithm is only five bytes, Johansen
was able to find over 170 player keys by trial and error. Id.
45 Corley, 273 F.3d at 437.
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quence of binary digits (zeros and ones).46 It is directly executable by
the computer.47 Pure object code "can be, and often is, read and un-
derstood by experienced programmers";48 however, it is not an easy or
effective tool for a programmer to communicate ideas because it is
only a sequence of numbers. 49 Consequently, programmers have de-
veloped programming languages that employ syntax and symbols to
convey meaning.50 Source code refers to programs written in these
languages.51 Like object code, it represents instructions to the com-
puter. "Source code, however, must be converted into object code before a
computer will execute the software's instructions."52
Johansen posted only the executable object code on his personal
website. 53 He then notified members of an Internet mailing list that
46 Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 483 (6th Cir. 2000). Binary digits are zeros and
ones that represent the absence (zeros) or presence (ones) of an electrical charge, to
which the computer responds.
47 Corley, 273 F.3d at 438-39; Junger, 209 F.3d at 483; Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at
305.
48 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 446.
49 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 305; see Corley, 273 F.3d at 439 ("Source code has
the benefit of being much easier to read (by people) than object code .... ").
50 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 306; see Corley, 273 F.3d at 439; Bernstein v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that a "programmer
must follow stringent grammatical, syntactical, formatting and punctuation conven-
tions"), reh'g granted, opinion withdrawn by Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 192 F.3d
1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
51 Corey, 273 F.3d at 439; see also Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1140 & n.11 (noting that
the distinguishing feature of source code is that it is meant to be read and understood
by humans"). Java, Basic, and C++ are examples of commonly known programming
languages used to write source code. Id. The Second Circuit explained that "com-
puter languages range in complexity, object code can be placed on one end of a
spectrum, and different kinds of source code can be arrayed across the spectrum
according to the ease with which they are read and understood by humans." Id.
52 Junger, 209 F.3d at 483 (emphasis added); see also Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1140
(finding that "a computer... can make no direct use of source code"); NLFC, Inc. v.
Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Computers do not act
directly on souice code instructions, but rather transform them into object code
within the machine."); Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 305 ("All data and instructions
input to or contained in computers therefore must be reduced the numerals 1 and
0.") (emphasis added). Compare Junger, 209 F.3d at 483 ("This conversion is con-
ducted by compiler software.... some source code may have no compatible com-
piler."), and Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 306 ("Some highly skilled human beings can
reduce data and instructions to strings of l's and O's.... But it would be inconve-
nient, inefficient and, for most people, probably impossible to do so."), with Corley,
273 F.3d at 439 ("[A]s a general matter [source code] ... must be translated back to
object code before it can be read by a computer. This task is usually performed by a
program called a compiler.").
53 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
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he had done so. 5 4 Within months, both the object code and various
versions of source code were available on hundreds of websites. 55 In
October 1999, the studios sent cease and desist letters to website oper-
ators who posted DeCSS on their websites.5 6 Although some website
operators complied, many refused to remove DeCSS.5 7
Eric Corley and his company, 2600 Enterprises, publish a print
magazine, 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, and maintain an affiliated web-
site.58 The magazine and website "cover some issues of general inter-
est to computer users" but are geared for "hackers."59 The term
"hackers" has misleading connotations; the "so-called hacker commu-
nity includes serious computer-science scholars conducting research
on protection techniques, computer buffs intrigued by the challenge
of trying to circumvent access-limiting devices or perhaps hoping to
promote security by exposing flaws in protection techniques. ' 60 In
November 1999, Corley wrote and posted on the website an "article
about the DeCSS phenomenon. '61 The article, in full, appeared as
follows:
The November 25, 1997 edition of Off The Hook (relevant portion
21 minutes into show), reported that DVD copy protection had
been defeated. The method involved a C program that hooks into
the device drivers from Zoran's SoftDVD player to intercept de-
coded DVD data. Two years later, the encryption itself has been
cracked.
Contents Scrambling System (CSS) is used in DVD copy protection
to encode movies. Each DVD player, both software and standalone
home theater systems, needs to have a key to decode the movie.
Last week the Norwegian group Masters of Reverse Engineering
54 Id. at 311.
55 Corley, 273 F.3d at 439.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 439-40 ("The movie industry tried to stem the tide by sending cease-and-
desist letters to many of these sites. These efforts met with only partial success; a
number of sites refused to remove DeCSS."); Courtney Macavinta, Movie Trade Group
Tries To Block DVD Cracking Too CNET News.com (Nov. 18, 1999), at http://news.
com.com/2100-1023-233258.html (discussing the response to cease and desist
letters).
58 Corey, 273 F.3d at 435, 439. Court filings and related documents are posted on
the magazine's website. DVD Lawsuit Archive, at http://iw.2600.com/dvd/docs/
(last visited Apr. 24, 2002); see also infra note 207 (providing website addresses of
organizations that post these materials with accompanying supplementary resources).
59 Corey, 273 F.3d at 439.
60 Id. See generally Matthew Schwartz, DVD Enryption Hacked, CNN.com (Nov. 5,
1999), at http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9911/05/dvd.hack.idg/index.
html (discussing the appearance and rapid spread of DeCSS).
61 Corley, 273 F.3d at 439.
1656 (VOL- 77:5
THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
(MORE) discovered that the DVD player XingDVD did not encrypt
its key for decrypting DVDs.
As a result they were able to create DeCSS, a free DVD decoder, that
not only facilitated the creation of previously unavailable open
source DVD players for Linux - also allowed people to copy DVDs.
After the discovery of Xing's key they were able to derive over a
hundred additional keys due to the weaknesses of the encryption
algorithm. The ease in which this was accomplished can be blamed
notjust on Xing's sloppiness, but on the United State's [sic] notori-
ously antiquated encryption export laws that forced DVD manufac-
tures to use weak encryption (40 bit) in the first place.
In the last few days there have been numerous reports of movie
industry lawyers shutting down sites offering information about
DeCSS. 2600 feels that any such suppression of information is a
very dangerous precedent. That is why we feel it's necessary to pre-
serve this information. We do feel sympathy for the DVD industry
now that their encryption has been cracked. Perhaps they will learn
from this. We hope they apply that knowledge in a constructive
way. If they choose to fall back on intimidation, we'll just have to
deal with that. 6 2
At the end of the article, Corley posted links to the DeCSS code and to
other websites containing the code.
63
C. Application of the Trafficking Prohibition
In January 2000, eight movie studios sued Corley and 2600
Enterprises (collectively Corley) under the DMCA in the South-
ern District of New York.6 4 The case was heard by Judge Kap-
62 DVD Encryption Cracked, 2600 THE HACKER QUARTERLY (Nov. 12, 1999), at
http://iwv.2600.com/news/display.shtml?id=20. On the website, the title "Off The
Hook" is a hyperlink. Id.
63 Id.; see Corley, 273 F.3d at 439.
64 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), afld sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001). There were two other defendants named in the complaint, but they entered
into consent decrees with the studios. Id. at 312 n.91. The trial "defense team [was]
led by the prominent First Amendment lawyer Martin Garbus, and financially backed
by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a free-speech group." Carl S. Kaplan, Is Link-
ing Illegal?, N.Y. TiuMs ON THE WEB (June 16, 2000), at http://www.nytimes.com/li
brary/tech/00/06/cyber/cyberlaw/161aw.html. In December 1999, the DVD CCA
sued Andrew Bunner and numerous other website operators in California, under the
state's Uniform Trade Secrets Act to enjoin them from publishing or linking to
DeCSS. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 341 (Ct. App.
2001), review granted, No. S102588, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 614 (Cal. filed Feb. 20, 2002).
On January 21, 2000, the Bunner trial court issued a preliminary injunction prohibit-
ing further posting or disclosure of DeCSS. Id. at 344. It refused to enjoin linking to
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lan.65 The studios sought an injunction prohibiting both posting
DeCSS on the magazine's website and linking to other websites that
posted it.66
The DMCA "makes it unlawful to offer, provide, or otherwise traf-
fic in" circumvention technology, but the statute does not define "of-
fering," "providing," or "trafficking. '67 Judge Kaplan found that
the phrase "or otherwise traffic in" modifies and gives meaning to
the words "offer" and "provide." In consequence, the anti-traffick-
ing provision of the DMCA is implicated where one presents, holds
out or makes a circumvention technology or device available, know-
ing its nature, for the purpose of allowing others to acquire it.6 8
Judge Kaplan further found that Corley violated the anti-traffick-
ing provision by posting the code and linking to websites that contain
it because such actions constituted offering and providing circumven-
tion technology.69 He rejected Corley's arguments that the DMCA
was unconstitutional on its face or as applied,70 and that his activities
fell under one of the statutory exemptions (if the DMCA was constitu-
other sites because it reasoned that links were indispensable to Internet access and
website operators could not be held accountable for the content of other websites.
Id. The appellate court overturned the preliminary injunction as a prior restraint on
pure speech. Id. at 351-52. On February 20, 2002, the California Supreme Court
granted review of the decision. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, No. S102588,
2002 Cal. LEXIS 614 (Cal. filed Feb. 20, 2002). The Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) is coordinating the defense in both the Corley and Bunner cases. Their website
tracks all the litigation involving DeCSS and provides court filings, press releases,
news articles, discussion forums and links to other sites tracking litigation involving
DeCSS. Electronic Frontier Foundation, at http://www.eff.org (last visited Apr. 24,
2002).
65 Judge Kaplan's opinion includes a very helpful section on the terminology and
technical aspects of the case. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 305-10; see also DVD
Demystified, at http://www.dvddemystified.com/dvdfaq.html (last revision Mar. 10,
2002) (providing comprehensive answers to frequently asked questions about DVDs
and related products). The DVD CCA's website provides answers to frequently asked
questions about CSS and states the organization's position regarding DeCSS. DVD
CCA, at http://www.dvdcca.org/faq.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2002).
66 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 303. Judge Kaplan had granted a preliminary
injunction prohibiting posting of the code but consolidated with the trial on the mer-
its the motion to expand it to include linking. Id. at 304 n.2. Linking refers to provid-
ing a cross reference to another website. See generally Corley, 273 F.3d at 455-56
(clarifying the definition of linking as used in the injunction).
67 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp 2d at 325. Judge Kaplan defines these terms by using a
dictionary. Id. (citing 2 THE COMPAcT EDITION OF THE OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
3372 (traffic), 2340 (provide), 1979 (offer) (1971)).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 317, 325.
70 Id. at 327-33.
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tional).71 Judge Kaplan found that computer code and linking are
speech under the First Amendment.72 However, he reasoned that the
"functional" capability, of both computer code and links, was analo-
gous to expressive conduct (which combines speech and nonspeech
components) and therefore warranted only intermediate scrutiny.73
Under intermediate scrutiny, he held that the DMCA, on its face, was
a content-neutral regulation.74 He then granted a permanent injunc-
tion that prohibits posting the code and knowingly linking to websites
that contain it. 75
Corley renewed his constitutional arguments on appeal to the
Second Circuit and argued that the injunction was an unconstitu-
tional content-based application of the DMCA.76 The Second Circuit
affirmed the injunction, and the finding that the DMCA, on its face
and as applied in this case, was content-neutral. 77 It also affirmed that
intermediate scrutiny was the correct standard for analyzing the scope
of First Amendment protection for both computer code, the dissemi-
nation thereof, and linking.78 It reasoned that the unique characteris-
tics of computer code, decryption code in particular, and the Internet
as a medium for communication justified the application of a lesser
standard than that applicable to other types of speech and mediums.79
71 Id. at 319-24.
72 Id. at 327, 339.
73 See id. at 326-32, 339; see also discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing regulations
of expressive conduct).
74 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 333, 345.
75 ML (finding that the injunction was a content-neutral application of the
statute).
76 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001). The
court summarizes the constitutional arguments as follows:
Corley renews his constitutional challenges on appeal. Specifically, he ar-
gues primarily that: (1) the DMCA oversteps limits in the Copyright Clause
on the duration of copyright protection; (2) the DMCA as applied to his
dissemination of DeCSS violates the First Amendment because computer
code is "speech" entitled to full First Amendment protection and the DMCA
fails to survive the exacting scrutiny accorded statutes that regulate "speech";
and (3) the DMCA violates the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause
by unduly obstructing the "fair use" of copyrighted materials. Corley also
argues that the statute is susceptible to,.and should therefore be given, a
narrow interpretation that avoids alleged constitutional objections.
Id.
77 Id. at 456-58, 468.
78 Id. at 450-53.
79 Id. at 454-55, 457. On January 14, 2002, the EFF filed a motion requesting en
banc review, http://vwwv.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAADVDLcases/20020114_-ny-2600-
appeal.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2002).
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II. COURTS SHOULD APPLY STRICT SCRUTINY WHEN APPLYING THE
TRAFFICKING PROHIBITION TO TECHNOLOGY THAT Is
ALSO SPEECH
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making a law that
abridges freedom of speech.80 That prohibition is not absolute.
Courts must first determine if there is "speech" within the meaning of
the First Amendment.81 Speech encompasses "[e]ven dry informa-
tion, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expression, '8 2
and conduct with a speech component.8 3
If Congress attempts to regulate constitutionally protected
speech, based on its content, the court will apply strict scrutiny.84 A
regulation is content-based when the government adopts the regula-
tion because of the message the speech conveys.8 5 It is also content-
based when the government regulates expressive conduct because the
government disapproves of the ideas expressed.8 6 Content-based reg-
ulations are presumptively invalid.8 7 For a regulation to be constitu-
tional under strict scrutiny, it must "promote a compelling interest,"
and be "the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest."88
Intermediate scrutiny applies if the regulation is unrelated to
content.8 9 Content-neutral regulations burden speech without refer-
ence to the ideas expressed. 90 A regulation is constitutional, under
intermediate scrutiny, if it serves a substantial governmental interest
that is unrelated to the suppression of speech, and the regulation is
narrowly tailored.91 For example, "'time, place, and manner' regula-
tions are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial
80 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
81 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
82 Corey, 273 F.3d at 446.
83 Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
84 E.g., Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see alsoTurner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (noting that most exacting scrutiny
applies to regulations that "suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens
upon speech because of its content").
85 E.g., Sable, 492 U.S. at 126; see also, e.g., Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
86 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 382 (1992).
87 Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
88 Id.
89 E.g., Turner, 512 U.S. at 642; see also, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-20.
90 E.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 720; Turner, 512 U.S. at 643.
91 Turner, 512 U.S. at 662. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d
429, 450 n.25 (2d Cir. 2001) for a discussion of the "slightly different formulations to
express the narrow tailoring requirement of a content-neutral regulation."
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governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative ave-
nues of communication. '92 The Second Circuit noted that "[t]he Su-
preme Court's approach to determining content-neutrality appears to
be applicable whether what is regulated is expression,... conduct, or
any 'activity' that can be said to combine speech and non-speech ele-
ments."93 Therefore, if the government's interest in regulating the
conduct is because of the message the conduct conveys, strict scrutiny
will apply.94
A. Source Code and Object Code Distinguished
Although both the Second Circuit 95 and Judge Kaplan 96 dis-
cussed the differences between the types of code, they did not distin-
guish between the codes for the purpose of First Amendment analysis.
The Second Circuit analogized code to musical scores and recipes,
both of which are protected speech. It found that code is also speech
because it has the capacity to convey information, 97 and it expresses
the programmer's ideas.98 It also found that programmers use code
as a learning tool and "almost inevitably communicate in code" when
expressing ideas to each other.99
92 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); see also Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 327-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Be-
cause restrictions of this type are not motivated by a desire to limit the message, they
will be upheld if they serve a substantial government interest and restrict First Amend-
ment freedoms no more then necessary."), affd sub nom. Corley, 273 F.3d 429.
93 Corley, 273 F.3d at 450.
94 See Hil 530 U.S. at 720; RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
95 See Corey, 273 F.3d at 439.
96 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06.
97 Corey, 273 F.3d at 446-47 ("A recipe is no less 'speech' because it calls for the
use of an oven, and a musical score is no less 'speech' because it specifies perform-
ance on an electric guitar.").
98 See id.; see also Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't ofiustice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding that source code is "meant for human eyes and understanding" and
that it "can be used to express an idea or a method"), reh'ggranted, opinion withdrawn
by Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999); Bernstein v. U.S.
Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that "source
code is a means of original expression").
99 Corley, 273 F.3d at 447. While Judge Kaplan also stated that all code is "human
readable," he found that programmers understand source code's expression, and it con-
veys the programmer's ideas. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 329; see also Bernstein, 176
F.3d at 1141 (finding that "cryptographers use source code to express their scientific
ideas in much the same that mathematicians use equations or economists use graphs"
(emphasis added)).
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The Second Circuit stated that it was joining other courts that
have found that computer code is protected speech,100 but failed to
note that each of those courts held that source code is speech. 101 The
Sixth Circuit's decision in Junger v. Daley is illustrative. 10 2 The Junger
court found that "for individuals fluent in a computer programming
language, source code is the most efficient and precise means by which
to communicate ideas."' 0 3 It held that "[b]ecause computer source
code is an expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas
about computer programming . . it is protected by the First
Amendment." 0 4
This distinction is important because the Second Circuit found
that computer code is functional.10 5 It held that the code's "func-
tional capability is not speech within the meaning of the First Amend-
ment,'' 06 and therefore it must be treated as combining speech and
nonspeech elements for the purposes of First Amendment analysis.10 7
100 Corley, 273 F.3d at 449 (citingJungerv. Daley 209 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2000);
Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1140-41; Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9-10
(D.D.C. 1996); Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1434-36).
101 Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1141 & n.15 ("[W]e conclude that encryption software, in
its source code form . .. must be viewed as expressive for First Amendment pur-
poses .... [but] [w]e express no opinion regarding whether object code manifests a
'close enough nexus to expression."'), reh'g granted, opinion withdrawn by Bernstein v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999); Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1436
("For the purposes of First Amendment analysis, this court finds that source code is
speech."); see Kar v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1996) ("[F]or the
purpose of addressing the dispositive issue whether the regulation is justified and
permissible, the Court will assume that the protection of the First Amendment ex-
tends to the source code .... ").
102 Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484-85 (6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 484 (emphasis added). It also noted that "computer source code,
though unintelligible to many, is the preferred method of communication among
computer programmers." Id. at 484; see also Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1140-41 & n.11
(noting that source code is "merely text" and that it is used for "expressive purposes").
The Second Circuit also noted that "[p]rogrammers use snippets of code to convey
their ideas for new programs," Corley, 273 F.3d at 448 n.21, but failed to recognize that
this is most likely to be in source code because it is capable of more expression as it
uses words and symbols rather than a string of zeros and ones.
104 Junger, 209 F.3d at 485 (emphasis added).
105 Corey, 273 F.3d at 454. Contra Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1142 (finding that "source
code.., cannot be used to control directly the functioning of a computer").
106 Corley, 273 F.3d at 454. But see Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1142 (noting that "ignor-
ing the distinction between source and object code obscures the important fact that
source code is not meant solely for the computer, but is rather written in a language
intended also for human analysis and understanding").
107 Corley, 273 F.3d at 454; see also discussion infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the appli-
cation of intermediate scrutiny to speech and nonspeech elements combined in the
same course of conduct).
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It reasoned that "[u]nlike a blueprint or a recipe, which cannot yield
any functional result without human comprehension of its content,
human decision-making, and human action, computer code can in-
stantly cause a computer to accomplish tasks and instantly render the
results of those tasks available throughout the world via the In-
temet."108 While recognizing that "a human being decides to insert
the disk containing the code into a computer and causes it to perform
its function," the court found that "this momentary intercession of
human action does not . . . render code entirely speech, like a
blueprint or a recipe." 109
However, the court's reasoning is fundamentally flawed because
the court failed to distinguish between source and object.code. Only
object code is directly executable by the computer's microproces-
sor.110 Source code cannot yield a functional result without human
action far beyond deciding to run the code. For source code to cause
the computer to perform, the user must first convert it into machine-
readable object code, either by application of compiler software or
translation.' In either case, until the source code is converted, it
cannot cause the computer to function anymore than a blueprint can
cause the design to be constructed or a recipe can cause the food to
be prepared. Like reading a blueprint or a recipe, a human must
"comprehend" the source code to determine if a compiler exists. Like
gathering the materials or ingredients, they must "decide" what com-
piler to use based on its availability and characteristics or how to oth-
erwise translate it. Finally, like building or preparing, they must "take
action" by performing the conversion. This process is not as simple as
inserting a disk. Like a recipe or a blueprint, source code is simply a
set of instructions that requires much more than a "momentary in-
tercession of human action" to yield a functional result.112 Source
code does not have a functional capability; therefore, it is also "en-
tirely speech," and it should not be subjected to a "different standard
than that applicable to pure speech."113
108 Corley, 273 F.3d at 451.
109 Id.; see also David L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEx. L. REv. 99, 115-17 (2000)
(discussing a similar analogy). But see Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp.
1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Source code is essentially a set of instructions to that is
used indirectly in a computer since it must be translated into object code to achieve
the desired result.").
110 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (defining object code and ex-
plaining its capabilities).
111 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (defining source code and ex-
plaining its capabilities).
112 See supra text accompanying note 109.
113 Corley, 273 F.3d at 451.
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It is unclear what level of scrutiny would apply when DeCSS is
expressed in ways that are undoubtedly non-functional. For example,
Professor Touretzky of Carnegie Mellon University maintains a schol-
arly website that makes DeCSS available in many forms, including art-
work, poems, songs, t-shirts, and in programming languages for which
no compiler exists. 114 Another website runs a contest for incorporat-
ing DeCSS into artistic creations. 115 These expressions of DeCSS (like
source code) cannot cause a computer to perform, but a computer
programmer could use them to compile object code.1 16 Judge Kaplan
seemed to suggest that he would enjoin these other methods of ex-
pressing DeCSS. He stated that the injunction only drew the line at
prohibiting code, rather than "other modes of expression that convey
the same idea" because that is all "the relief plaintiffs sought."' 1 7
In contrast, the Second Circuit held that the DMCA was "applied
to DeCSS solely because of its capacity to instruct a computer to
decrypt CSS,"118 which indicates that it would not apply the DMCA to
expressions (like t-shirts, songs, or poems) that clearly lack any func-
tional capability. However, it is not clear where the Second Circuit
would draw the line between what is functional and what is "entirely"
speech. A t-shirt containing the object code could not "instantly cause
a computer to accomplish tasks,"1 19 but if someone choose to input
the code into a computer, it would cause the computer to perform.
However, it is not clear that this would be enough "human action"
and "decision-making" for it to be considered "entirely speech." 120
114 D. S. Touretzky, Gallery of CSS Descramblers, at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/
DeCSS/Gallery (last modified Feb. 26, 2002).
115 Tom Vogt, DeArt, at http://www.lemuria.org/DeArt/ (last visited Apr. 26,
2002).
116 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 345 n.275 (discussing the testimony of Professor
Touretzky). Professor Touretzky has posted his testimony and the documents he sub-
mitted to the trial court. Touretzky, supra note 114 (providing additional links to
media coverage of trial and the gallery); see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text
(discussing necessity of compiling source in order to execute its instructions).
117 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 345 n.275
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Access control measures such as CSS do involve some risk of
preventing lawful as well as unlawful uses of copyrighted material."), affd sub nom
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
118 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 454 (2d Cir. 2001) (empha-
sis added).
119 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's
reasoning for finding that code has a functional capability).
120 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's
reasoning for finding that, because code is functional, it is not "entirely speech").
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B. Functionality Does Not Justify a Lesser Standard
1. Speech and Nonspeech Elements
The Second Circuit found that "[t] he functionality of computer
code properly affects the scope of its First Amendment protection,"12 1
following extensive quotation of Judge Kaplan's reasoning that the
functional aspect of the code itselfjustifies the application of interme-
diate scrutiny. 22 Judge Kaplan based this assertion on the Supreme
Court's distinction between the speech and nonspeech elements of
expressive conduct in United States v. O'Brien.123 The Second Circuit
held that the "realities of what code is and what its normal functions
are require a First Amendment analysis that treats code as combining
nonspeech and speech elements, i.e., functional and expressive
elements."124
In O'Brien, the Supreme Court held that if "'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct," then
"a sufficiently important interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limits on First Amendment freedoms."1 25 The
statute at issue prohibited the destruction of draft cards, which the
Court noted, "plainly does not abridge free speech on its face."'12 6 It
also found that "both the governmental interest and the operation of the
[statute] are limited to the noncommunicative aspect."'127 It held that
the statute was constitutional because it was "an appropriately narrow
means" of protecting the government's interest and it "condemn[ed]
only the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its
reach."12 8
Like the statute in O'Brien, the DMCA does not abridge speech
on its face. However, as interpreted by the Second Circuit, its opera-
tion is not limited to the non-communicative aspect, and therefore
the O'Brien distinction does not supply a basis for applying intermedi-
ate scrutiny to the prohibition of source code. 129 Regulating the func-
121 Id. at 452.
122 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 332-33. Judge Kaplan states that code designed
to circumvent can be regulated based on its content. Id. at 333.
123 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
124 Corley, 273 F.3d at 451. Contra Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp.
1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that because "source code is speech and not
conduct, O'Brien does not appear to provide the appropriate standard").
125 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
126 Id. at 375.
127 Id. at 381-82 (emphasis added).
128 Id. (emphasis added).
129 See id.; see also Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.G. 1996).
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tional aspect of source code is not analogous to regulating conduct
because conduct may or may not be expressive. In O'Brien, there was
"nothing necessarily expressive about such conduct," which is not true
of source code because it necessarily expresses the writer's ideas. 30
Judge Kaplan noted numerous times that it is the dissemination of the
code that causes the harm.' 3 ' Furthermore, he found that "the statu-
tory purpose [is] preventing dissemination of circumvention technol-
ogy."132 This weighs against the analogy to O'Brien because the
O'Brien Court stated that "[t]he case at bar is therefore unlike one
where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises
in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the
conduct is itself thought to be harmful."'133 Therefore, even if code
had a functional aspect it would not be analogous to the regulation of
a nonspeech component.
2. Regulation of the Code vs. Regulation of Corley's Speech
The court should not have considered what level of scrutiny ap-
plied to computer code. Whether code can be prohibited, consistent
with the First Amendment, is relevant only to the prohibitions against
creating it, manufacturing it, or marketing it, none of which were at
issue in this case.1 34 Judge Kaplan held that Corley violated the
The plaintiff disputes this characterization of the law, arguing that the na-
ture of the matter regulated, (e.g., whether "conduct" or "pure speech"), as
opposed to the rationale for the regulation, actually dictates the level of scru-
tiny to be applied .... The Court disagrees, as the plaintiff's argument
places form over substance. Pursuant to extensive First Amendment juris-
prudence, the government's rationale for the regulation controls, regardless
of the "form of the speech or expression" regulated.
Id. (discussing the application of O'Brien standard to a computer program).
130 See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing cases finding that source
code is expressive).
131 The "harm is done by dissemination." Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 342-43 & n.267 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), afffd sub nom. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). The court "would
uphold the application of the DMCA now before it on the ground that this record
establishes an imminent threat of danger flowing from dissemination of DeCSS." Id.
at 333 n.216. "[D]issemination itself carries very substantial risk of imminent harm."
Id. at 332 (analogizing communication over the Internet to spread of contagious dis-
ease). The government has a legitimate right to prevent harm from dissemination.
Id. at 333.
132 Id. at 340.
133 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
134 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317, 319. The manufacture, import, and use of
the code after acquiring it, by any means, is already prohibited by the DMCA. See
supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. One reporter noted that
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DMCA by posting and linking to the code13 5 and that Corley could not
avail himself of the statutory exemptions because he did not author
the code. 3 6 Once the Second Circuit determined that the expressive
aspect of the code was protected speech, it should have considered
only what level of scrutiny applied to Corley's speech. Corley's speech
was disclosing the code by posting and linking to it, not the code itself.
The failure to distinguish between the code and Corley's speech
is important because the Supreme Court has instructed that a "naked
prohibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as regulation of
pure speech."' 3 7 As applied by the Second Circuit, the trafficking pro-
vision is a naked prohibition of any disclosure. Therefore, it should
be characterized as a regulation of pure speech. This characterization
is significant because, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held
that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit... forbid[ding] or proscrib[ing] advocacy... of law viola-
tion except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion.' 38 Yet Judge Kaplan found that the defendants "offered and
provided DeCSS by posting it on their web site" and stated that
"[w]hether defendants did so in order to infringe, or to permit or
encourage others to infringe, copyrighted works in violation of other
provisions of the Copyright Act simply does not matter for purposes of
§ 1201(a)(2)."139 If the courts had treated code as pure speech, then
Brandenburg would have required finding both an intent to incite or
produce imminent lawless action and that it was likely to produce
such action. It would not have mattered even if Corley had intended
to incite violations of the DMCA's trafficking prohibition (assuming
that it was even possible for him to know that the trafficking provision
would apply to posting or linking), because it would be a very circular
[a]Ithough it makes sense to prosecute wholesale piracy, it makes no sense
whatsoever to refuse to produce software to allow people to play legally ac-
quired discs on devices they own and then prosecute them if they write their
own software. It makes even less sense to prosecute people for doing what
the Web was built for: posting and linking to useful information.
Wendy Grossman, DVDs! Cease and DeCSS2, SCIEiNFiC AM. (May 16, 2000), at http://
wwv.sciam.com/2000/0500issue/0500cyber.html.
135 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317, 319, 325.
136 Id. at 320.
137 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001).
138 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
139 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit also
rejected Corley's argument thatJudge Kaplan's linking test "was deficient for not re-
quiring proof of intent to cause, or aid or abet, harm." Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 456-57 (2d Cir. 2001).
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reasoning to hold that he intended to cause a violation and is likely to
cause a violation of the very law that forbids his speech.
The Second Circuit cited Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC to jus-
tify the application of a lesser First Amendment standard to code be-
cause of its functional characteristics. 140 In Red Lion, the Court stated
that "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences
in the First Amendment standards applied to them."'141 However, the
Court also noted that "it is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas... rather than to coun-
tenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Govern-
ment itself or a private licensee."1 42
The Second Circuit found that "[1] imiting First Amendment pro-
tection.., to descriptions of computer code (but not the code itself)
would impede discourse among computer scholars."'143 Yet by finding
that the DMCA reaches and prohibits dissemination of both object
and source code, the Second Circuit restricts any access to computer
code that is capable of circumvention, even non-functional source
code. This is contradictory to the Supreme Court's instruction that "it
is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences .... That right may
140 Corley, 273 F.3d at 451 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969)).
141 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
142 Id. at 390; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 545, 559 (1985) (finding that "copyright is intended to increase and not to im-
pede the harvest of knowledge" and stating that the "right not to speak would [not]
sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to suppress
facts"). The president of the MPAA, Jack Valenti, "vowed patriotically to keep filing
lawsuits until every Web site carrying the dangerous DeCSS program has been com-
pletely suppressed." C. Scott Ananian, Criminal Code?, Salon.com (Feb. 9, 2000), at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/02/09/linuxdvd/indexl.html. One re-
porter, who is also a "hacker," noted that "whether DeCSS promotes piracy isn't even
the real issue. To the hackers hard at work coding the world of tomorrow the real
problem is the criminalization of source code .... Traditionally our activism has
been through writing code." Id. See generally Damien Cave, Can Hyperlinks Be Out-
lawed, Salon.com (Apr. 6, 2000), at http://www.salon.com/tech/log/2000/04/06/
decss/index.html (discussing Mark Litvack, the MPAA's vice president and director of
legal affairs for worldwide anti-piracy, position on hyperlinks); Deborah Durham-
Vichr, Protest Draws Attention to DMCA, Linuxworld.com (Mar. 30, 2000), at http://
www.linuxworld.com/linuxworld/lw-2000-03/lw-03-dmca.html (reporting that "[n] ot
only could the broadness of the new law affect Linux development of DVD software,
say protesters-citing threats by the MPAA to go after the DVD driver for Linux-it
could also discourage software advances, such as those made by reverse
engineering").
143 Corley, 273 F.3d at 447.
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not constitutionally be abridged."' 44 Because the "prohibition on
posting prevents ... conveying to others the speech component of
DeCSS,"'1 45 and the "prohibition on linking restricts... [the] ability to
facilitate access to whatever protected speech is available on those
sites,"'146 if a court applies the anti-trafficking provisions to source
code at all, then it should apply strict scrutiny to ensure that it is the
least restrictive means of preventing a violation.
Red Lion cannot support a lesser First Amendment standard be-
cause the Supreme Court has limited its application to the broadcast
medium.147 The Court instructed that "the unique physical character-
istics of cable transmission" should not be ignored in "determining
the constitutionality of regulations affecting cable speech. . . . But
whatever relevance these physical characteristics may have in the eval-
uation of particular cable regulations, they do not require the alteration
of settled principles of our First Amendment jurisprudence."148
The Second Circuit also used the isolated statement in Red Lion
to justify the application of a lesser First Amendment standard to the
Internet, because of its unique characteristics, as a medium for dis-
semination. 149 This was an inappropriate extension because the Su-
preme Court has explicitly stated that the Red Lion principle does not
extend to cyberspace. In Reno v. ACLU, the Court held that the
broadcast "cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium."' 50 It
explained that some cases have "recognized special justifications for
regulation of the broadcast media that are not applicable to other speak-
ers... the Court relied on the history of extensive Government regula-
tion of the broadcast medium, the scarcity of available frequencies at
144 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
145 Cor/ey, 273 F.3d at 454.
146 Id. at 457 n.32.
147 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1994) ( "[T]he inherent
physical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the broadcast medium
has been thought to require some adjustment in traditional First Amendment analy-
sis .... [The] cases are inapposite in the present context because cable television
does not suffer from the inherent limitations .... ").
148 Id. at 639 (emphasis added) (discussing a statute that required cable operators
"to carry" broadcast programming).
149 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 451-52.
150 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (citations omitted); see also Turner,
512 U.S. at 639 ("In light of these fundamental technological differences between
broadcast and cable transmission, application of the more relaxed standard of scru-
tiny adopted in Red Lion and the other broadcast cases is inapt when determining the
First Amendment validity of cable regulation.").
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its inception, and its 'invasive' nature," and "[t]hose factors are not
present in cyberspace." 151
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court struck down certain por-
tions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) that regulated
"speech" on the Internet, as unconstitutionally overbroad content-
based regulation of speech. 152 The DMCA's trafficking provision suf-
fers from many of the same flaws identified by the Court in Reno.
First, the DMCA is not limited to "commercial speech or commercial
entities."153 Its prohibition against "providing" or "offering" has the
potential to reach any and all dissemination of circumvention technol-
ogies, regardless of whether there is a commercial motive or even an
intent to cause, aid, or abet circumvention or infringement.1 5 4 The
151 Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 (emphasis added). Compare Corley, 273 F.3d at 451,
454-56, withACLU v.Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing Reno,
521 U.S. at 870).
The Court has determined which level of scrutiny to apply to particular types
of speech, depending in part on the particular speech medium involved.
Thus, for example, attempts to regulate the print media have been subjected
to strict scrutiny, while the broadcast media have been afforded less First
Amendment protection. After examining the nature of the Internet, and
concluding that it is more similar to the telephone as a communication me-
dium than to the broadcast media, the Court in Reno determined that the
Internet deserved the highest level of First Amendment protection.
Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1156 n.4; see also Todd G. Hartman, The Marketplace vs. the Ideas:
The First Amendment Challenges to Internet Commerce, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 426
(1999) (stating that the only decisive issue in Reno was that the Internet is not a me-
dium subject to exceptions from the normal application of First Amendment
protections).
152 Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
153 Id. at 877. The DMCA does create some exemptions but they are very narrow.
For example, factors for determining if the encryption research exemption applies
include: whether the information obtained "was disseminated, and if so, whether it
was disseminated in a manner reasonably calculated to advance the state of knowl-
edge or development of encryption technology," 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (g) (3) (A) (Supp. V
1999), if "the person is engaged in a legitimate course of study, is employed, or is
appropriately trained or experienced, in the field of encryption technology," id.
§ 1201 (g) (3) (B), and "whether the person provides the copyright owner of the work
to which the technological measure is applied with notice of the findings and docu-
mentation of the research." Id. § 1201(g) (3) (C). It also exempts certain non-profit
organizations from civil liability for the act of circumvention, Id. § 1201 (d) (3) (A),
(B), but not from the anti-trafficking provision. Id. § 1201(d)(4). These organiza-
tions are exempted from criminal liability for violation of § 1201 or § 1202. Id.
§ 1204(b); see also supra note 7 (listing statutory exemptions).
154 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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statute is vague1 55 because it does not define "trafficking," "offering,"
or "providing," which are the elements of both the civil and criminal
offense. 56 By allowing courts to define those terms, the statute cre-
ates the possibility of discriminatory enforcement (both civilly and
criminally), and that creates a significant chilling effect.157 The Su-
preme Court noted that "[a]s a practical matter, this increased deter-
rent effect [of criminal sanctions], coupled with the 'risk of
discriminatory enforcement' of vague regulations, poses greater First
Amendment concerns."' 58 This does not mean that the statute is
155 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 872-74 (finding that vagueness is a factor leading to deter-
mination that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad). The Court found that
the ODA
lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regu-
lates the content of speech... [it] presents a greater threat of censoring
speech that, in fact, falls outside the statute's scope. Given the vague con-
tours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers
whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection.
Id. at 874. Judge Kaplan considered the applicability of the overbreadth. Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 337-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub
nom Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). He held that
because several factors weighed against "permitting defendant to mount an over-
breadth challenge," id. at 338, the "defendants will not be heard to mount an over-
breadth challenge in this context." Id. at 339 (emphasis added). But see Forsyth
County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992) ("It is well established that
in the area of freedom of expression an overbroad regulation may be subject to facial
review and invalidation, even though its application in the case under consideration
may be constitutionally unobjectionable."). Judge Kaplan also held that because the
defendants "engaged in conduct clearly proscribed by the DMCA," they. could not be
heard to complain of vagueness and that "they will not be heard to complain of any
vagueness as applied to others." Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 339 (emphasis added).
156 See supra notes 21, 68 and accompanying text.
157 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 872-74.
158 Id. at 872.
In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the CDA
threatens violators with penalties including up to two years in prison for
each act of violation. The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause
speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful
words, ideas, and images.
Id. The DMCA provides for more severe sanctions. 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (Supp. V 1999).
It provides as follows:
(a) In general. Any person who violates section 1201 or 1202 willfully and
for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain-
(1) shall be fined not more than $ 500,000 or imprisoned for not more
than 5 years, or both, for the first offense; and
(2) shall be fined not more than $ 1,000,000 or imprisoned for not
more than 10 years, or both, for any subsequent offense.
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wholly unconstitutional 159 because, unlike the CDA, it is not on its
face directed at speech or, more particularly, to Internet speech.
However, as applied by the Second Circuit, the DMCA regulates
speech, particularly when the Internet is used as a medium. Even that
does not necessarily mean that the DMCA is unconstitutional on its
face or as applied, but it does strongly suggest that if a court applies
the DMCA to "speech" at all, it should apply strict scrutiny.
While the Second Circuit raises legitimate concerns about the In-
ternet's capability of wider dissemination, such concerns cannotjustify
the suppression of speech in one medium (but not in more tradi-
tional mediums). The court discusses whether Congress's "un-
doubted power" to prohibit distribution of obscene materials could
justify enjoining a magazine from printing the addresses of bookstores
that sell obscene materials, and distinguishes this from providing
hyperlinks on the Internet.' 60 It reasons that
the evil of distributing such materials can be prevented by injunctive
relief against the unlawful distribution (and similar distribution by
others can be deterred by punishment of the distributor). And if
others publish the location of the bookstore, preventive relief
against a distributor can be effective before any significant distribu-
tion of the prohibited materials has occurred. The digital world,
however, creates a very different problem. If obscene materials are
posted on one web site and other sites post hyperlinks to the first
site, the materials are available for instantaneous worldwide distri-
bution before any preventive measures can be effectively taken.16 1
(b) LIMITATION FOR NONPROFIT LIBRARY, ARCHIVES, EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION,
OR PUBLIC BROADCASTING ENTri.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to a non-
profit library, archives, educational institution, or public broadcasting entity
(as defined under section 118(g).
(c) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-No criminal proceeding shall be brought
under this section unless such proceeding is commenced within 5 years after
the cause of action arose.
Id.
159 See generally Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 (finding that the statute's vagueness "provides
further reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDA's burden
on protected speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully
drafted statute").
160 Corley, 273 F.3d at 457. But see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997) (find-
ing Congress's attempt to regulate obscenity on the Internet unconstitutionally over-
broad). See generally Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129
(1992) ("It is well established that in the area of freedom of expression an overbroad
regulation may be subject to facial review and invalidation, even though its applica-
tion in the case under consideration may be constitutionally unobjectionable.").
161 Corley, 273 F.3d at 457.
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The Second Circuit clarified that the district court's injunction
applies only to hyperlinks162 because "a hyperlink has both a speech
and a nonspeech component," it "conveys information," but also "has
the functional capacity to bring the content of the linked web page to
the user's computer screen."' 63 Under this reasoning, it is acceptable
to post the address of a website containing the code, as long as the
address is not a functional hyperlink. 64 This illustrates the fallacy of
the functionality justification because a user simply has to cut and
paste or type the address into the browser to accomplish the same
result as using a hyperlink, with only a little more effort expended
(typing or four clicks of the mouse instead of one click).165
3. Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral
In the Supreme Court's words, "[t]he principal inquiry in deter-
mining content-neutrality, in speech cases generally ... is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagree-
ment with the message it conveys.' 166 The Second Circuit found that
the interest in preventing the dissemination of code was content-
neutral because Congress's interest was in regulating the functional
(nonspeech) element, not the information the code conveys. 167 How-
ever, regulating the posting of the code because of its subject matter
(circumvention) 68 does not make the regulation content-neu-
162 "A hyperlink is a cross-reference (in a distinctive font or color) appearing on
one web page that, when activated by the point-and-click of a mouse, brings onto the
computer screen another web page." Id. at 455. It can appear as text (either the
address of the linked website, a descriptive word, or phrase) or as an icon (picture).
Id. at 455.
163 Id. at 456. It clarifies that the injunction only applies to active links. Id. An
active link is functional in that it brings the content to the user's computer screen
when it is clicked while an inactive link is not functional because it only provides the
website address. Id. See generally Cameron Pope, Comment, Missing Links(s): Protecting
Public Image and Corporate Profits in Cyberspace, 38 Hous. L. REv. 651 (2001) (examining
the practice of linking and ensuing litigation).
164 Cor/ey, 273 F.3d. at 256.
165 See id. at 455-56 n.31 (explaining that "inactive links" can be cut and pasted
into browser).
166 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
167 Corley, 273 F.3d at 454-55.
168 Id. at 453. The court held that
just as the realities of what any computer code can accomplish must inform
the scope of its constitutional protection, so the capacity of a decryption
program like DeCSS to accomplish unauthorized-indeed, unlawful-access
to materials in which the Plaintiffs have intellectual property rights must in-
form and limit the scope of its First Amendment protection.
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tral. 69 The Supreme Court has instructed that the "[r]egulation of
the subject matter of messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-
based regulation, is also an objectionable form of content-based
regulation."'170
The anti-trafficking provision, when applied to source code, dif-
fers significantly from regulations that the Supreme Court has found
are content-neutral. 17 1 In Hill v. Colorado, the Supreme Court found
that the regulation was content-neutral because " [i] t places no restric-
tions on-and clearly does not prohibit-either a particular viewpoint
or any subject matter that may be discussed by a speaker. Rather, it
simply establishes a minor place restriction on an extremely broad cat-
egory of communications with unwilling listeners."'17 2 In Turner, the
Court found that the provisions were content-neutral because they did
not "prohibit particular ideas," did not "penalize cable operators or
programmers because of the content of their programming," and did
"not produce any net decrease in the amount of available speech."17 3
As interpreted by the Second Circuit, the prohibition against posting
source code will result in a "net decrease" in speech because it "pre-
vents the Appellants from conveying to others the speech component
of DeCSS.' 74 The prohibition also penalizes website operators for
the content of their sites, not just in the form of suppressing their
speech by an injunction but also by subjecting them to civil liability or
criminal liability for violating the anti-trafficking provision. The link-
ing prohibition penalizes site operators who are not even subject to
the DMCA; the court notes that it
restricts more than Corley's ability to facilitate instant access to
DeCSS on linked web sites; it also restricts his ability to facilitate
access to whatever protected speech is available on those sites. How-
ever, those who maintain the linked sites can instantly make their
protected material available for linking by Corley by the simple ex-
pedient of deleting DeCSS from their web sites.' 75
169 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000).
170 Id.
171 See id.; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Ward, 491 U.S. at
791; Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
172 Hill 530 U.S. at 723 (reviewing a statute that regulated speech-related conduct
within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care facility).
173 Turner, 512 U.S. at 647.
174 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 2001).
175 Id. at 457 n.32. Another notable distinction is that the Turner Court found that
Congress's objective was to preserve access to free television programming for the
40% of Americans who did not have access to cable. Turner, 512 U.S. at 646. It found
that Congress designed the provisions "to prevent cable operators from exploiting
their economic power . . . and thereby ensure that all Americans, especially those
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Thus, website operators must either censor content or risk that
other website operators subject to the DMCA will not be able to link to
their page.
The Second Circuit's reasoning for finding that the application
of the anti-trafficking provision to linking is content-neutral is seri-
ously flawed. It found that the prohibition is content-neutral because
it applies regardless of whether the link contains or displays any infor-
mation that is comprehensible to a human. 176 For example, a link
that displays a picture of flowers but leads to a website with DeCSS is
prohibited, as well a link that displays only the web address or text.
However, a link that promotes DeCSS and provides the address (but
does not take the user directly to the other website) is not prohib-
ited.177 This reasoning ignores the fact that the link is prohibited because
of the content (making DeCSS available) of the linked-to-site; the link's for-
mat is irrelevant to the essential purpose of the prohibition, which is
to prevent facilitating access to the code.178 As the Second Circuit
noted, links are prohibited because they have the "functional capacity
to bring the content of the linked web page to the user's computer
screen."1 79 The district court's formulation of a test to avoid the chil-
ling effect of strict liability does not change the fact that the link is
enjoined because of the content on the linked-to sites.'8 0
4. Secondary Effects
In Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., the Supreme Court found that
some content-based restrictions are treated as content-neutral when
the government desires to eliminate "secondary effects" that are only
indirectly related to the content or communicative impact of the
unable to subscribe to cable, have access to free television programming-whatever
its content." Id. at 649. The anti-circumvention and trafficking provision alters tradi-
tional copyright law by allowing copyright owners "to control access to content, not
just uses of content" because it regulates technology not infringing acts. Neil Wein-
stock Netanel, From the Dead Sea Scrolls to the Digital Millennium; Recent Developments in
Copyright, 9 TEx. INrELL. PROP. L.J. 19, 20 (2000) (emphasis added). The district
court noted that "Congress elected to leave technologically unsophisticated persons
who wish to make fair use of encrypted copyrighted works without the technical
means of doing so." See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d
294, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), afrd sub nom. Corley, 273 F.3d 429.
176 Corley, 273 F.3d at 456.
177 See id. at 455.
178 See id.
179 Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
180 See id. Additionally, the Second Circuit stated "we see no need on this appeal
to determine whether a test as rigorous as Judge Kaplan's is required to respond to
First Amendment objections." Id. at 457.
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speech.1 81 However, this cannot support the finding that these provi-
sions of the DMCA, as applied, are content-neutral because the gov-
ernment's interest is in the functional aspects of the code. 82 The
Supreme Court has clarified that "secondary effects" do not justify reg-
ulations that are aimed at the "direct impact" of the speech. 183 It has
also held that when a law "regulates speech due to its potential primay
impact.., it must be considered content-based. 18 4
In Boos v. Barry, the Court clarified the applicability of Renton.185
It found that "secondary effects" referred to "regulations that apply to
a particular category of speech because the regulatory targets happen
to be associated with that type of speech.... [slo long as the justifications
have nothing to do with content."1 86 The Boos Court distinguished this
regulation at issue, because in Renton, the "desire to suppress crime
ha[d] nothing to do with the actual films being shown," while in Boos,
regulating the location of picket signs was justified "only by reference
to the content of speech. '18 7
Like the regulation in Boos, the DMCA as applied is not "view-
point based," but rather prohibits "an entire category of speech."1 88
The DMCA, as interpreted, prohibits the provision of code that is ca-
pable of circumventing access-control measures. While the regulatory
target may well be the functional aspect of code, the justification for
prohibiting all circumvention code has everything to do with its actual
content, that is, its ability to decrypt encryption measures designed to
prevent access to a copyrighted work, not just to decrypt encryption
measures or to perform a function. For example, a website can con-
tain code that circumvents access-control measures of works not pro-
tected by copyright. Judge Kaplan points out numerous times that it is
the dissemination of DeCSS that causes the harm and violates the stat-
ute,1 89 a point that the Second Circuit affirms.1 90 Therefore, it does
181 See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (finding that an
ordinance regulating the location of adult movie theaters was content-neutral).
182 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 455-56.
183 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) ("Regulations that focus on the direct
impact of speech .... are not the type of 'secondary effects' we referred to in Ren-
ton."); see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997); Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380,
385 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The Supreme Court has defined secondary effects as being cor-
related with, but not directly a consequence of, the impact of the speech.") (discuss-
ing several Supreme Court cases regarding secondary effects).
184 Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (emphasis added).
185 See id. at 320-21.
186 Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
187 Id. at 320-21.
188 Id. at 319.
189 See supra note 131.
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not meet the definition of a secondary effect. Furthermore, these
cases deal with time, place, and manner restrictions, not bans on cer-
tain types of speech.191 The DMCA as applied is not regulating when
or where speech can take place but rather permanently enjoins Corley
from engaging in the prohibited speech.1 92
As applied by the Second Circuit, the DMCA's anti-trafficking
provision is a content-based regulation. It is not prohibiting the con-
duct (posting and linking) in all circumstances without reference to
content, but rather it is prohibiting the conduct when the content is
circumvention computer code.' 93 The court considered separately
"the scope of First Amendment protection for computer code, and the
scope of First Amendment protection for decryption code."'194 It found
that the fact that decryption programs can "accomplish unautho-
rized-indeed, unlawful-access to materials in which the Plaintiffs
have intellectual property rights must inform and limit the scope of its
First Amendment protection."' 95 This is not to suggest that the
DMCA must prohibit all code or all posting to be considered content-
neutral. It would be content-neutral if the application extended to all
expressions of the code that could be compiled into object code, or if
the prohibition extended to publication in the print medium as well
as posting.' 96 However, the Second Circuit's application of the
DMCA, by applying a different standard to source code and dissemi-
nation thereof on the Internet than is applied to other types of speech
or media, renders the application content-based.
190 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459-60 (2d Cir. 2001).
"The advent of the Internet creates the potential for instantaneous worldwide distri-
bution of the copied material." Id. at 453.
191 See Reno v. AGLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). The Reno Court held that
the purpose of the CDA is to protect children from the primary effects of
"indecent" and "patently offensive" speech, rather than any "secondary" ef-
fect of such speech. Thus, the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on
speech, and, as such, cannot be "properly analyzed as a form of time, place,
and manner regulation."
Id.
192 Compare Corky, 273 F.3d at 445-53 (interpreting statutory provision as being
applicable to computer code and applying intermediate scrutiny to a permanent in-
junction forbidding posting or linking to certain types of computer code), with Reno,
521 U.S. at 868 (applying strict scrutiny to statutory provisions that impose a "content-
based blanket restriction on speech")
193 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 445.
194 Id. (emphasis added).
195 Id. at 453.
196 See supra notes 149-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's
application of a lesser First Amendment standard).
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III. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making a law that
abridges the freedom of the press. 197 If the Second Circuit had
treated posting a news article on the Internet as analogous to printing
the same article in a traditional medium, two recent Supreme Court
cases strongly suggest that strict scrutiny is the proper First Amend-
ment test.198 In Florida Star v. B.J.F, the Court set out the test for
"punishing" the media for dissemination of truthful information. 199
State officials cannot constitutionally punish a newspaper for publish-
ing truthful information, about a matter of public significance, which
it lawfully obtained, unless the punishment furthers a state interest of
the highest order.200 Even then, the punishment must be narrowly
tailored to further that need.20 1 The Court noted that punishing the
press for dissemination of information that is already publicly availa-
ble is unlikely to further the government's interest.20 2
Corley was acting as a member of the press. He wrote a news
article and posted it on the magazine's website. 203 It described the
rapid appearance of DeCSS on hundreds of websites and the movie
industry's efforts to shut down those sites, which is truthful informa-
197 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
198 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524
(1989). Indeed, the Supreme Court's holding in Brandenburg mandates that a law
require intent to incite or produce imminent lawless action when it forbids or pros-
cribes speech. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also supra text
accompanying notes 138-39 (comparing holdings in Brandenburg and Reimerdes). In
Bunner, a California appellate court found that the application of the First Amend-
ment did not depend on whether publication occurred on the Internet or by tradi-
tional means. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 347 (Ct.
App. 2001) (reviewing preliminary injunction against posting DeCSS on websites),
review granted, No. S102588, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 614 (Cal. filed Feb. 20, 2002). The court
discussed Bartnicki but found it was not controlling because the defendant posted it
on his personal website. See id. at 347 & n.7 (finding also that Bartnicki did not involve
trade secrets or prior restraints). It also found that the level of scrutiny did not de-
pend on whether an individual posted the code on a website rather than printing it as
a media publication in a newspaper. Id. The Court applied strict scrutiny because it
found that posting DeCSS on a website is pure speech, the preliminary injunction
prohibiting posting DeCSS was a prior restraint on pure speech, and that it could not
be upheld under strict scrutiny. See id. at 350-52.
199 Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 533, 541 (discussing this test where publication revealed
name of rape victim).
200 Id. at 541.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 535.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
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tion.204 The newspaper and website coverage in the same time pe-
riod,20 5 the continuing coverage,20 6 and widespread support in amici
briefs20 7 demonstrates that it was and is a matter of public signifi-
204 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
205 Borland, supra note 36; Macavinta, supra note 57; Andy Patrizo, The DVD Hack:
VWiat Next?, Wired News (Nov. 4, 1999), at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/
0,1282,32265,00.html (discussing motivation of DeCSS developers, the studio's ac-
tions and website operator's responses); Patrizo, supra note 39; Patrizo, supra note 44;
Schwartz, supra note 60, at http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9911/05/dvd.
hack.idg/index.html (discussing the appearance of DeCSS). See generally News in
1999, OpenDVD Group, at http://opendvd.org/news1999.php3 (last visited Apr. 26,
2002) (providing links to news coverage of DeCSS in 1999). Corley was not the only
reporter who included links to the code, "reporters and editors at sites like Wired
News, Slashdot, and CNET's News.com, who have included links to DeCSS in news
stories [and] as part of their coverage of the lawsuit." John Borland, Hollywood Looks
To Kill Hyperlinks in Copyright Fights, CNET News.com (July 25, 2000), at http://
news.com.com/2100-1023-243607.html?tag=bplst ("The New York Times Co. has sup-
ported 2600 Enterprises' right to link to the contested DeCSS software, noting that it,
too, provided links to the controversial code."); Macavinta, supra note 57 (reporting
that "CNET Download.com also published the program. Almost 5,000 copies were
downloaded before the site removed DeCSS yesterday in response to the MPAA's let-
ter."); Declan McCullagh, Only News That's Fit To Link, Wired.com (Aug. 23, 2000), at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0%2C1283%2C38360%2C00.html. Corley pre-
sented papers to the court showing
that many other news organizations, including the Web sites of The New
York Times, The San Jose Mercury News, the Associated Press and the Vil-
lage Voice, have in the course of news articles about the case linked to sites
that contain DeCSS or to sites that contain a catalog of links to DeCSS sites.
Kaplan, supra note 64 (stating also that "[a] crucial aspect of online journalism is the
ability to garnish articles with hyperlinks that instantly refer readers to Web sites re-
lated to newsworthy issues").
206 Ananian, supra note 142 (discussing protests in seventy-four North American
and twenty-six other cities worldwide); Scott Bradner, DVD and the Digital Copyright Act,
CNN.com (Feb. 4, 2000), at http://wv.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/02/04/
dvd.law.idg/index.html; Cave, supra note 142; Durham-Vichr, supra note 142; Amy
Harmon, Free Speech Rights for Computer Code?, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB (July 31, 2000),
at http://vwv.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/07/biztech/articles/31rite.html;
Kaplan, supra note 64. See generally News in 2000, OpenDVD Group, at http://www.
opendvd.org/news2000.php3 (last visited Mar. 25, 2002) (providing links to news cov-
erage of DeCSS in 2000); News in 2001, OpenDVD Group, at http://www.opendvd.
org/news.pfip3 (last visited Apr. 26, 2002) (providing links to news coverage of
DeCSS in 2001.)
207 The amici briefs are available at Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.
eff.org/IP/Video/MPAADVD-cases/20010126_ny--effpressrel.html (last visited
Apr. 26, 2002); EFF "Intellectual Property: DVD CCA (DVD Content Copy Control
Association) Case" Archive, at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/DVDCCA case/ (last
visited Apr. 26, 2002) (including trial transcripts, depositions, affidavits and supple-
mental letters); The Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Openlaw: Open DVD, at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2002) (including
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cance. Corley lawfully obtained the code because it was freely availa-
ble on the Internet. 20 8
In Corley's words, he added the code to the story because "in ajour-
nalistic world.... [y] ou have to show your evidence.., and particu-
larly in the magazine that I work for, people want to see specifically
what it is that we are referring to," including "what evidence ... we
have" that there is in fact technology that circumvents CSS. Writing
about DeCSS without including the DeCSS code would have been,
to Corley, "analogous to printing a story about a picture and not
printing the picture." Corley also added to the article links that he
explained would take the reader to other web sites where DeCSS
could be found.20 9
Even if the trafficking provision is correctly interpreted as prohib-
iting the posting of the code and Corley had obtained it from a site
subject to U.S. law, that should not affect the level of scrutiny applied
to Corley's posting of the code. 210 The Supreme Court recently reaf-
links to news articles, discussion forums, working papers, and various background
sources); and DVD Lawsuit Archive, at http://vwv.2600.com/dvd/docs/ (last visited
Apr. 24, 2002). Amicus briefs were filed by Online News Association; Reporters' Com-
mittee for Freedom of the Press; Newspaper Association of America; Student Press
Law Center; Wired; Pew Center on the States; Silha Center for Media Ethics and Law;
College of Communications - CSU, Fullerton (arguing that linking prohibition cre-
ates a chilling effect that threatens freedom of the press); Stanford Law professor
Lawrence Lessig, who co-sponsored a brief with NYU professor Yochai Benkler (argu-
ing that the application of the DMCA is unconstitutional under the first amendment);
Julie Cohen, Georgetown University professor, filed on behalf of numerous law school
professors (arguing that the DMCA is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope
of Congress's power); James Tyre, Esq. on behalf of computer programmers and
scholars (arguing that source code is entitled to full First Amendment protection);
ACM Law Committee Chair Andrew Grosso with Eddan Katz (arguing that narrow
reverse engineering exemption threatens innovation, science and free expression);
Jennifer Granick, of Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society, on behalf
of cryptographers (arguing that this science is threatened because it relies on the
open exchange of information); American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); Digital Fu-
ture Coalition (DFC); American Library Association (ALA); American Research Li-
braries (ARL); Music Library Association (MLA) (arguing that fair use requires
availability of fair use tools); and Edward Cavazos and Gavino Morin from Cavazos,
Morin, Langenkamp & Ferraro L.L.P. on behalf of educators who rely on fair use
rights (arguing that elimination of fair use impedes the educational use of intellectual
property). See generally Declan McCullagh, DeCSS Allies Ganging Up, Wired.corn (Aug.
23, 2000), at http://wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41441,00.html (discussing the di-
verse groups that filed an amicus brief).
208 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 439 (2d Cir. 2001).
209 Id. at 439 (citations omitted).
210 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-28 (2001).
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firmed and broadened the Florida Star rule.21' In Bartnicki v. Vopper,
the question was whether the government could punish a publisher
who lawfully obtained information from a source who obtained it ille-
gally212 A radio station broadcasted tapes received from a source that
had illegally intercepted calls, the content of which was subsequently
reported by other media.213 The Court held that the government
could not punish the publisher, even if it knew or should have known
that the source obtained the information illegally.2 14 The govern-
ment had argued that prohibiting disclosure by the newspaper re-
moved the incentive for others to intercept calls and minimized the
harm to the private parties whose calls were intercepted.21 5 The
Court explained that the "normal method of deterring unlawful con-
duct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who en-
gages in it."216 It was unmoved by the incentive argument, suggesting
instead increased sanctions on the illegal interception.2 1 7 The Court
stated "it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a law-
abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter
conduct by a non-law-abiding third party."2 18
The conduct that Congress sought to deter through the anti-traf-
ficking provision (piracy) is more attenuated than the conduct in
Bartnicki (illegal interception of communications). The Second Cir-
cuit found that the injunction furthers the goal of preventing circum-
vention.2 1 9 Congress enacted the DMCA to provide protection against
piracy,2 20 which is what arguably legitimizes the prohibition on cir-
cumventing access-control measures. As interpreted, the anti-traffick-
ing provision prohibits any disclosure of DeCSS code because someone
else might use it to circumvent access-control measures. 22 1 Even using
211 Id. at 525, 528-30.
212 Id. at 525.
213 Id. at 517-19.
214 See id. at 529-30, 535.
215 Id. at 529.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 529-30.
219 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 454, 457 (2d Cir. 2001).
But cf. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("The court does not find workable a theory of infringe-
ment that would hold the entire Internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be
deterred.").
220 See sources cited supra note 13.
221 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 325, 331
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), af'd sub nom. Corley, 273 F.3d 429. Onejournalist explained the issue
as follows:
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the code does not violate any of the copyright holders exclusive
rights22 2 or cause any loss to the studios because all the code does is
provide access to the work. 223 Now having access to the files, the user can
choose to make fair use224 of the work or to make infringing copies,2 25
just as the user of a book can choose to read it or choose to infringe
by copying and distributing it.226
IV. THE ENDS Do NOT JUSTIFY THE MEANS
In Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, the Supreme Court instructed that
when speech is regulated "as a means to redress past harms or prevent
anticipated harms," the government 227 must "demonstrate that the re-
In essence, the DVD case does not center on traditional copyright issues, like
how much of a given work may be freely copied, or how many copies may be
legally made, or even.., who can be held liable for enabling someone else
to make illegal copies .... [S]ome people in the debate see it as a funda-
mental change-as if the law now made it illegal not only to photocopy and
sell a copyrighted book, but also to simply tell someone how to open and
read that book without the publisher's authorization.
Harmon, supra note 206.
222 See supra note 10 (listing exclusive rights). DeCSS does not infringe on these
rights because it does not produce copies; it simply decrypts CSS, thereby allowing
users access to the digital files. See Corey, 273 F.3d at 437-38, 453.
223 The Second Circuit notes that "the use of DeCSS to gain access to a DVD
movie creates no loss to movie producers because the initial user must purchase the
DVD." Corley, 273 F.3d at 453.
224 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The statute provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or pho-
norecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Id. See generally Netanel, supra note 175, 45-47 (discussing the development of the
fair use doctrine).
225 17 U.S.C. § 105(a) (defining infringement as violation of exclusive rights or
importing copies in violation of § 602).
226 See supra note 221.
227 The United States intervened to support the constitutionality of the DMCA.
CorLey, 273 F.3d at 443.
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cited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation
will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way."228 As
applied, the DMCA is regulating speech, even if it is aimed at the func-
tional aspects of code. It regulates Corley's speech regarding the code
because "the fundamental choice between impairing some communi-
cation and tolerating decryption cannot be entirely avoided" 229 or, in
Judge Kaplan's words, because "harm is done by dissemination."230 In
Turner, the Court also states "[t]hat Congress's predictive judgments
are entitled to substantial deference does not mean, however, that
they are insulated from meaningful judicial review altogether."231 Un-
like Congress's predictive judgments, the plaintiff's predictions are
not entitled to substantial deference, and yet in this case, they are
accepted with very little judicial review.23 2 Judge Kaplan found that
plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law233 because proof of actual
228 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994).
229 Corley, 273 F.3d at 458.
230 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 342 n.267, 343
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub nom. Corley, 273 F.3d 429; see also infra note 131 (citing nu-
merous instances where Judge Kaplan made this assertion).
231 Turner, 512 U.S. at 666.
232 An example is that the "record leaves largely unclear how CSS protects against
the copying of a DVD, as contrasted with the playing of a DVD on an unlicensed player."
Corley, 273 F.3d at 438 n.5. The defense presented experts who testified that CSS does
not in its operation prevent copying of the files and that copying the files bit for bit
(without decryption) also results in fully playable movies. Id. "Some of the Plaintiffs'
experts countered simply that 'copying to a hard drive is something that compliant
DVD players are not allowed to do,' without explaining why." Id. (quoting Dr.
Michael I. Shamos, Trial Tr. 37). Another asserted that even if DVDs can be copied,
they cannot be played unless the DVD is in the drive. Id. However, the Second Cir-
cuit found that "none of this detracts from these undisputed findings: some feature of
either CSS itself, or another (unidentified) safeguard implemented by DVD manufac-
turers.., makes it difficult to copy a CSS-encrypted DVD to a hard drive and then
compress that DVD to the point where transmission over the Internet is practical." Id.
(emphasis added). However, these findings were disputed as the court itself notes at
the beginning of the same footnote, "[a]n item of some controversy, both in this
litigation and elsewhere, is the extent to which CSS-encrypted DVDs can be copied
even without DeCSS." Id.; see also Sean M. Dugan, R.LP. DVD: The Still-Young Age of
Digital Video Disks Is Coming to an Inevitable End, Info World, at http://v.info
world.com/articles/op/xml/00/02/14/O00214opprophet.xml (Feb. 4, 2002) ("Bi-
zarrely, the MPAA doesn't seem to understand its own technology. It is touting the
DeCSS case as an anti-piracy issue, which isn't exactly right. The CSS on DVDs only
prevents playback."); Grossman, supra note 134 ("DeCSS supporters are right to ar-
gue that CSS doesn't prevent wholesale commercial piracy. Bit-by-bit professional
copies of DVDs include CSS in all its glory, so pirated discs will play perfectly.").
233 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 343 (discussing authority to grant an injunction
under the DMCA).
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damages "would be difficult if not virtually impossible" 234 and that it
would require proof of the extent that movie attendance, sales and
rentals of DVDs, and sale of broadcast and other rights "were and will
be impacted by the availability of DVD decryption technology. '23 5
While proof of the extent may be impossible, the court should at least
have required the plaintiffs to prove that DeCSS will affect these
rights,2 _8 6 especially considering that the studios could not point to an
instance where DeCSS was used to infringe. 23 7
There are legitimate concerns regarding the possibility of in-
creased piracy because digital files can be copied without degradation.
However, the fact that harm is possible does not establish that the
harm is real. Judge Kaplan found that "[t]here is little room for
doubting that the broad dissemination of DeCSS threatens ultimately
to injure or destroy plaintiffs ability to distribute their copyrights
works on DVDs." 238 The Second Circuit found that "DeCSS enables
the initial user to copy the movie in digital form and transmit it in-
stantly in virtually limitless quantity, thereby depriving the movie pro-
ducer of sales. ' 23 9 Even accepting that the "only rational assumption
is that once a computer program capable of bypassing such an access-
control system is disseminated, it will be used 240 does not establish
that the threat is real because DeCSS does not produce infringing
copies; it simply decrypts CSS, allowing the user access to the digital
files. 24 1
Using DeCSS to decrypt a DVD is a "computationally intensive"
process that took the plaintiffs expert twenty to forty-five minutes to
complete. 2 42 AsJudge Kaplan noted "decryption... is only the begin-
ning of the tale," now having access to the unencrypted files, the user
can copy them to the computer hard drive.2 43 However, the resulting
computer file is very large, which makes it "extremely cumbersome to
234 Id. at 343-44.
235 Id. at 344.
236 See Turner, 512 U.S. at 664 (stating that the "recited harms" must be shown to
be "real"); see also supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
237 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 314. The plaintiffs stipulated that there was no
direct evidence of any person decrypting a copyright protected movie and transmit-
ting it over the Internet. Id. However, the plaintiffs' expert "pursued" and was able
to obtain a pirated movie. Id. at 342.
238 Id. at 335.
239 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 453 (2d Cir. 2001).
240 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
241 See Corly, 273 F.3d at 437.
242 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 313.
243 4d.
THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
transfer or to store on portable storage media."244 The user could use
a separate program 245 to compress the file, but then she must synchro-
nize the sound and graphics files, which is a "tedious process" that
took the plaintiffs' expert between ten and twenty hours to com-
plete.246 The compressed file can fit on a CD-ROM, in some cases
with little loss of quality.247 DeCSS is only the first step of many
needed to create infringing copies, a process that would take a signifi-
cant amount of time and computer skills. This makes it hard to ac-
cept that the plaintiffs "overwhelmingly . . . established" a "clear
threat" from DeCSS itself.248 The real threat comes from the com-
pression software, because "[t] he ease of making perfect copies of dig-
ital information would not, in itself, pose a serious threat to copyright
holders if those copies could not be so easily distributed, but compres-
sion makes wide distribution a reality. '249
However, Judge Kaplan noted that the possibility of producing
pirated CDs was not the plaintiff's principal concern.250 The principal
concern was the possibility that pirated copies could be transmitted
over the Internet or other networks. 251 He noted that this raises
"more difficult" issues because even a compressed file can "take a good
deal of time to transmit."252 Transmission times vary depending on
244 Id. DVDs are capable of storing more than 4.7 GB of data. Id. at 307. The
decrypted file is between 4.3 GB to 6 GB or more depending on the length of the
film. Id. at 313. A CD-ROM is an optical disk that can store approximately 650 MB of
data. Id. at 307. One GB of data is equal to 1000 MB of data, so the decrypted file
would be 4300 MB to 6000 MB.
245 Id. at 313. DivX is the compression utility program that many Internet sites
promote for compression of movie files to a manageable size. Id.
246 Id. See generally Kramarsky, supra note 40, at 5-6 (explaining that
"[c]ompression is the reduction of a digital file's size using a compression al-
gorithm-a mathematical 'recipe' that permits the removal of redundant or non-es-
sential information").
247 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 307.
248 Id. at 342. Judge Kaplan held that the plaintiffs did not have to prove an actual
injury because the DMCA authorizes injunctions when plaintiffs "show only a threat of
injury by reason of violation of the statute." Id. at 342 & n.261 (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(b) (1) (1994)).
249 Kramarsky, supra note 40, at 6. Judge Kaplan recognized this when he noted
that "DivX... permits compression of the decrypted files to sizes that readily fit on a
writeable CD-ROM. Copies of such CD-ROMs can be produced very cheaply and dis-
tributed as easily as other pirated intellectual property." Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at
315.
250 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
251 Id.
252 Id. (emphasis added); Kramarsky, supra note 40, at 6-7 (noting that download-
ing uncompressed files on a standard modem "simply is not practical" and that even a
"DVD compressed with DivX would still take a few hours to download over a fast
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the type of Internet connection and its bandwidth. 253 The plaintiffs
expert recorded a transmission time of six hours.25 4 However, the ex-
pert's transmission times were skewed because the transmission was
done late at night, on a university system, after it had closed for the
year. 255 These conditions are highly favorable to high effective trans-
mission rates due to low traffic on the system.256
The Second Circuit acknowledged the lack of evidence when dis-
cussing Judge Kaplan's findings:
DeCSS was harming the Plaintiffs, not only because they were now
exposed to the possibility of piracy and therefore were obliged to
develop costly new safeguards for DVDs, but also because, even if
there was only indirect evidence that DeCSS availability actually facili-
tated DVD piracy, the threat of piracy was very real, particularly as
Internet transmission speeds continue to increase.257
It acknowledged "that there may be alternative means of ex-
tracting a non-encrypted, copyable movie from a DVD," but noted
Judge Kaplan's findings that "DeCSS is the superior means'of acquir-
ing easily copyable movies, and ... recommended by a DVD compres-
sion web site as the preferred tool for obtaining a decrypted DVD
suitable for compression."258 The Second Circuit found that Corley did
not present "evidence to refute any of these carefully considered find-
ings. '259 However, he could not refute the findings because they are
home connection"). But see Grossman, supra note 134 ("It is time-consuming and
most likely more expensive than buying the disc. On today's dial-up connections, one
side of a DVD, containing roughly three gigabytes, would take more than 14 hours to
download, not to mention all that storage space needed on your computer.").
253 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 314. "Large institutions such as universities...
often have networks... rated at 100 megabits per second." Id. In comparison, many
personal computers have modems that have a rated capacity of 56 kilobits per second,
DSL lines can have transfer rates of 7 megabits per second and network connections
in many college dorm rooms are capable of transfer rates of 10 megabits per second.
Id. A kilobit is 1000 bits, a megabit is 1,000,000 bits, and a gigabit is 1,000,000,000
bits. Additionally, "effective transmission times generally are much lower than rated
maximum capacities in consequence of traffic volume and other considerations." Id.
See supra note 244 for the amount of data storage capabilities for DVDs and the
decrypted files, however, note that transmission speeds are rated in bits per seconds
while file sizes refer to bytes (one byte is composed of eight bits).
254 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
255 Id. at 314 n.119.
256 Id.
257 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 442 (2d Cir. 2001) (empha-
sis added).
258 Id. at 438 n.5 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
259 Id. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 313-15, 342, for a full discussion of find-
ings. Judge Kaplan summarized the issue as follows:
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based on general predictions regarding the capability of producing
perfect copies.260 Moreover, he should not have been required to re-
fute the findings because Turnerrequires the government to prove the
"anticipated harms" are "not merely conjectural."261
However, the Second Circuit found that
the Appellants have not suggested, much less shown, any technique
for barring them from making this instantaneous worldwide distri-
bution of a decryption code that makes a lesser restriction on the
code's speech component..-.. Even if the Government, in defend-
ing the DMCA, must sustain a burden of proof in order to satisfy the
standards for content-neutral regulation, the Defendants must ad-
duce enough evidence to create fact issues concerning the current
availability of less intrusive technological solutions.2 62
The court was referring to the test set out in Turner for a "con-
tent-neutral regulation with an incidental effect on a speech compo-
nent" 263 However, before reaching that test, it should have required
the government to prove that the harm was not "merely conjec-
tural," 264 and not only that "the regulation of DeCSS by the posting
prohibition plainly serves that interest,"265 but also that the regulation
will "alleviate [the] harms in a direct and material way."266 The court
The net of all this is reasonably plain. DeCSS is a free, effective, and fast
means of decrypting plaintiffs' DVDs and copying them to computer hard
drives. DivX, which is available over the Internet for nothing, with the in-
vestment of some time and effort, permits compression of the decrypted files
to sizes that readily fit on a writeable CD-ROM. Copies of such CD-ROMs
can be produced very cheaply and distributed as easily as other pirated intel-
lectual property. While not everyone with Internet access now will find it
convenient to send or receive DivX'd copies of pirated motion pictures over
the Internet, the availability of high speed network connections in many
businesses and institutions, and their growing availability in homes, make
Internet and other network traffic in pirated copies a growing threat.
Id. at 315. This "threatens to reduce the studios' revenue from the sale and rental of
DVDs. It threatens also to impede new, potentially lucrative initiatives .... " Id.
260 See Corey, 273 F.3d at 438 n.5; see also supra note 232 (discussing expert
testimony).
261 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994).
262 Corley, 273 F.3d at 454 & n.28.
263 Id. at 454. "[T]he regulation must serve a substantial governmental interest,
the interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the inciden-
tal restriction on speech must not burden substantially more speech than is necessary
to further that interest." Id. (citing Turner, 512 U.S. at 662); see also Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968).
264 See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
265 Corley, 273 F.3d at 454.
266 Turner, 512 U.S. at 664; see also supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
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found that the "interest in preventing unauthorized access to en-
crypted copyrighted material is unquestionably substantial, and ....
that interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression." 267
However, what arguably legitimizes the government's interest in
preventing circumvention of access-control measures is the underly-
ing purpose of preventing piracy. The substantial amount of
processes beyond the use of DeCSS required to produce a pirated
copy indicates that enjoining posting or linking of source code is
neither a direct nor a material regulation.268
Additionally, the anti-circumvention provision already prohibits
use of the code to circumvent access-control measuress, and the
DMCA authorizes damages and criminal liability,269 which can deter
using source code to create executable programs. If executable code
is created and used to infringe, the Copyright Act provides remedies,
including injunctions, 270 impounding or destruction,271 and dam-
ages. 272 It also provides for criminal liability when infringement is
willful, for purpose of financial gain.273 The Copyright Act defines
"financial gain" as including "receipt, or expectation of receipt, of an-
ything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works."274 There-
fore, it will cover "swapping" pirated copies. Thus, Congress has
already provided the sanctions to deter the use of DeCSS, and to com-
pensate losses, if a person were to use it to pirate digital works. If the
267 Corley, 273 F.3d at 454.
268 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the steps necessary to
make source code functional); see also supra notes 242-56 (discussing substantial steps
necessary to create infringing copies after using DeCSS).
269 See discussion supra Part L.A
270 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994). The statute provides: "Any court having jurisdiction of
a civil action arising under this title may, subject to the provisions of 1498 of title 28,
grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to
prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright." Id. § 502(a) (emphasis added).
271 Id. § 503.
272 Id. § 504 (providing for either actual or statutory damages).
273 Id. § 506. The provision provides as follows:
(a) CRIMINAL INFRINGEMENT-Any person who infringes a copyright willfully
either-
(1) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or
(2) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means,
during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or
more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than
$ 1,000, shall be punished ....
Id.
274 Id. § 101 (emphasis added). See generally Ravn, supra note 8, at 762-77 (dis-
cussing statutory and common-law doctrines of copyright infringement).
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Second Circuit is correct that these are not effective deterrents, 275 the
Bartnicki Court instructs increased sanctions, not the suppression of
speech to deter the conduct of third parties.276 This is not to suggest
that injunctions prohibiting posting or linking to source code would
never be appropriate, but rather that when granting or reviewing
them, a court should apply strict scrutiny because such regulations
inevitably suppress the communicative aspect as well.277
CONCLUSION
It is the Second Circuit's interpretation of the DMCA, that the
anti-trafficking provision reaches dissemination of computer source
code that implicates the First Amendment. If the DMCA is intended
to reach source code through the trafficking provision, then for the
reasons discussed in this Note, it should be analyzed under strict scru-
tiny when injunctions are sought, because it is a content-based sup-
pression of pure speech.
It may be prudent to apply these provisions only to object code,
not solely because it is functional, but rather because it potentially
lacks the capacity for expression. However, if a court finds that object
code is expressive, then it should also be analyzed under strict scru-
tiny. This is especially true in cases where a member of the press pub-
lishes the code as part of a news story, because its functionality is not
relevant to its dissemination when that dissemination is for purposes
other than to cause or aid circumvention.
The rights protection provision already prohibits trafficking in
technology that circumvents measures that protect copyright owner's
rights, and that same provision is also enforceable by injunctions as
well as civil and criminal liability. Granted the copyright owner's
rights cannot be violated unless the user has access, but copyright
owners already have remedies for infringement of their rights. It is
questionable whether Congress needed to or should have extended
these rights by protecting access-control measures, thus allowing copy-
right owners to prevent access to copyrighted works. But it is unques-
tionably going too far to allow an interpretation of the DMCA that
also grants copyright owners the right to censor speech regarding ac-
cess-control measures.
275 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443, 451-52 (2d Cir.
2001); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331-33,
341-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub nom. Corley, 273 F.3d 429.
276 SeeBartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 215-18 (discussing the .Bartnicki Court's reasoning).
277 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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